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The practice of enterprise risk management (ERM) in the insurance industry has 
improved in recent years.  This is partly because insurers have strived to reinforce 
risk-based management, and partly due to regulatory pressure triggered by the 
financial crisis as well as increasingly large natural catastrophes. 
 
Insurers’ activities have expanded across many countries and markets. They must 
work within an increasingly difficult and complicated environment due to rapid 
globalization, technological development, and changes in nature (particularly in terms 
of climate change and earth movement). In order to overcome such increasing 
uncertainty around the Internationally Active Insurance Groups (IAIGs), they should 
improve their ERM, and regulators and insurers should cooperate with each other in 
order to create a market-based solution for these extreme events. 
 
This paper aims to review the current actions of regulators and insurers, and then 
summarize how we improve insurance ERM toward the next generation. The main 
components to consider are complementary mechanisms for the bounds of internal 
model and rational decision-making, and the reinforcement of a market-based solution 
mechanism.  
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1. Environment of Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) 
 
A. Movement on Regulatory Regime 
 
The key underlying trends of insurance regulation are the move from the 
formula-based solvency management to the risk based management and reinforcement, 
which shall be linked to the global financial stability agenda and the resilience to 
significant stress scenarios. 
 
As a result of globalization, national financial markets are increasingly integrated 
internationally.  In 1998 and 1999, the Basel Committee established a three-pillar 
regulatory framework ( capital requirement, risk management or supervision and 
transparency or disclosure )  for assessing the capital requirements for banks, called 
Basel Ⅱ1. Such bank regulation has given an impact on insurance regulation and 
supervision. 
 
In 1999, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors ( IAIS )2 began 
three-pillar approach to an insurer, relying on the Basel Ⅱ . In addition as the 
insurance market becomes more globally interconnected, the IAIS is keen to encourage 
closer collaboration and introduce peer review among members. Then the IAIS 
promotes common standards for regulation across the world with its Insurance Core 
Principles 3  ( ICPs ). The contents are in a risk based direction, and key 
recommendations include the introduction of an own risk and solvency assessment4 
( ORSA ) , which would require insurers to assess the viability of their risk management 
structures, demonstrate how risks influence decision making and set out management’s 
view of the capital needed for its future risk portfolio. 
 
In EU the direction of regulatory policy in each of the main sectors is set by 
pan-European authorities, which include the European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Authority ( EIOPA ). The Solvency Ⅱ project started aiming at reviewing the 
prudential regime for insurance and reinsurance undertakings in the European Union 
in November 2009. The Solvency Ⅱ Directive was adopted by the Council of the 
European Union and the European Parliament. In March 2013, EIOPA launched a 
public consultation on Guidelines related to the preparation for Solvency Ⅱ, which 
cover the following areas: 
 
*Systems of governance 
*A forward looking assessment of undertakings’ own risk ( based on ORSA principles) 
*Submission of information 
*Pre-application for internal models 
 
In the US insurance supervision continues to be primarily a state affair while the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners ( NAIC ) proceeds with Solvency 
Modernization Initiative ( SMI ) for updating to US regulations to align with the ICPs. 
                                                  
1 Basel Ⅱis the Basel Accords, which are now extended effectively by Basel Ⅲ, which are 
recommendations on banking laws and regulations issued by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision. Basel Ⅱ, initially published in June 2004, was intended to create an 
international standard for banking regulators to control how much capital banks need 
to put aside to guard against the typical and operational risks banks ( and the whole 
economy ) face. 
2 The IAIS was founded in 1994 as the global body focusing its attention entirely and exclusively on 
the regulatory and supervisory issues of the insurance sector. 
3 International Association of Insurance Supervisors, 2011, Insurance Core Principles, Standards, 
Guidance and Assessment Methodology, 1 October. 
4 ORSA required us to take a holistic and forward looking approach to manage risk across the full 
scope of the insurance group, and to show that the group can maintain and raise the capital to cover 
solvency requirements for the strategic planning period if necessary. For such purpose the IAIS 
requires insurers to establish and maintain a risk taking policy and a risk tolerance statement which 
sets out its overall quantitative and qualitative viewpoints. Such comprehensive statement describing 
the relationship among return, risk, and capital is called the Risk Appetite Statement. 
The SMI includes potential changes to capital adequacy, governance and risk 
management regulations. NAIC plans introduction of US ORSA5 in parallel with 
Solvency Ⅱ and ICPs. 
 
In 2005, Standard & Poor’s stated that an insurer’s ERM program becomes a 
critical component in its rating methodology. 
 
B. Regulatory reinforcement after Financial Crisis  
 
The 2007-09 Financial Crisis triggered by the U.S. subprime loan problem hit the 
financial sectors and economies overall extremely hard and has undermined the widely 
held belief that the existing global regulatory and supervisory structures are sufficient 
to cope with possible market excesses and trans border contagion. Since 2008 the global 
community has initiated a wave of regulatory actions. The G-20 governments and 
central banks provided more than $11,000bn to support in a direct as well as indirect 
way to the financial service sector, while less than $10bn to the insurance sector. 
 
In the context of the financial system the G-20, the Financial Stability Board 
(FSB)6 and the Joint Forum7 have been active in reviewing the regulatory framework 
for banks and such analysis has invariably flowed across to insurance. 
Banking will receive more attention and more power due to the expanding role of the 
central banks in macroprudential supervision to mitigate systemic risk. Thus central 
banks will increasingly be charged with responsibility for the supervision of the entire 
financial system including insurance. 
 
However a bank and an insurance company are different in business model and 
style of management8. Those of a bank are in the shorter term basis, while those of an 
insurance company are in the longer term basis. Such insurance characteristics come 
from their cash flows directly transacted between the assured and an insurer not 
through the financial system therefore the traditional insurance transaction does not 
generate systemic risk9. 
On the other hand banks collect deposits, issue loans and provide a variety of 
fee-based services whose cash flows are closely connected with the financial system and 
                                                  
5 National Association of Insurance Commissioners , 2011, U.S. Own Risk and Solvency Assessment 
(ORSA) Proposal, 11 February. 
6 The FSB is a reincarnation of the FSF(Financial Stability Forum) that has existed in the global 
financial architecture since the Asian Crisis in 1999 and came into operation in 2009 due to a decision 
taken by the G-20 Summit in London. 
7 The Joint Forum was set up in 1996 under the aegis of the BCBS(Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision) , IOSCO(International Organization of Securities Commissions) and the IAIS to carry 
forward the work initiated by the Tripartite Group in 1995. The Group was formed at the initiative of 
BCBS and was composed of bank, securities and insurance supervisors, each of them acting in their 
personal capacity. 
8 The CEA(the European insurance and reinsurance federation) carried out the deatailed analysis 
and issued the report ”Insurance: a unique sector Why insurers differ from banks” June 2010.   
9 The FSB defines systemic risk as follows: the risk of disruption to the flow of financial services that 
is : caused by an impairment of all or parts of the financial system: and , has the potential to have 
serious negative consequences for the economy. (“Guidance to assess the systemic importance of 
financial institutions, markets and instruments: Initial considerations”, FSB, International Monetary 
Fund and Bank for International Settlements, October 2009 ) 
therefore their price and condition are quickly adjusted and managed soon in tandem 
with the movement of market indicators. 
 
Insurance companies are mainly exposed to underwriting risk, market risk, credit 
risk, operational risk, and relatively benign liquidity. Insurers’ Asset Liability 
Management ( ALM ) is closely connected with their absorbing liability over its 
maturity of insurance contract. Therefore basically their price and condition are in 
longer term basis than those of banks, and insurance companies try to manage their 
holding risk portfolio in a total balance sheet approach. Their stance is for enjoying 
diversification benefit from the longer viewpoint and adjust their portfolio with 
reinsurance or hedge to pursue the efficiency of the Risk Adjusted Capital ( RCA ) 
Requirement10.  
 
Banks are mainly exposed to liquidity, market and credit risk but have no exposure 
to underwriting risk. Due to their cash flows and risk profile banks make their capital 
allocation and change their hedging strategy from the shorter viewpoint. 
 
Looking back the Financial Crisis an insurance was neither at the root of the crisis, 
nor the main recipient of government support. The collapse of AIG was triggered by not 
conventional insurance risk but substantially financial risk. The subsidiary of AIG; 
AIGFP ( AIG Holding’s Financial Product ), the subsidiary of AIG sold credit default 
swap that offered loss protection to investors of assets like multi-sector CDOs. AIGFP 
sold swaps on $73bn of CDOs to counterparties without having sufficient reserves to 
pay any claims that could occur or liquidity to post collateral. Falling value of CDOs 
protected by AIGFP increased the collateral requirements for AIG Holding, who did not 
have enough liquidity to post the required collateral and was on the verge of defaulting 
on its payments to counterparties. 
 
After the Financial Crisis the IAIS has taken an initiative role for harmonization of 
insurance regulation and supervision as a partner of other relevant bodies in particular 
the FSB and the IMF. 
 
Regulatory intentions are focusing not only on preventing or at least mitigating a 
further crisis. Many regulatory frameworks are beginning to include an enhanced ERM 
framework. 
 
C. Supervision on Internationally Active Insurance Groups  
 
Insurers’ activities expand across several countries and markets.  In contrast to 
such increasing global activities, insurance supervision has remained each country’s 
issue focusing on solo supervision. The IAIS introduced the concept of a Common Frame 
( ComFrame ) for the supervision of Internationally Active Insurance Groups ( IAIGs ). 
The industry was supporting the overall objective of this endeavor but there are a 
number of issues to be resolved. 
 
                                                  
10 The RAC of an insurance company is evaluated on the basis of a quantitative model of its different 
risks. The influence of dependence on the aggregated RAC should be carefully analyzed. In case a 
stress event occurs dependence is not linear correlation. It is possible to use the copulas instead of 
linear correlation to model dependences. 
Each jurisdiction has its own solvency and risk management regime and accounting 
standards that takes into account the unique characteristics and practices of insurance 
local market, and IAIGs developed own ERM and capital management practices across 
globe.  Actually each IAIG established its own ERM and capital management practice. 
The IAIS has reviewed both similarities in principles applied and diversity reflecting 
individual group characteristics. The Geneva Association surveyed indicated that 
insurance groups consider such IAIS’s reviewing to be beneficial to the market, as 
uniform approaches to risk management introduce the risk of herd behavior and 
outcomes11.  
 
I think that as underwriting risks are different in nature from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction, and each jurisdiction has created and developed the solution mechanism to 
fit to the particular market’s risk profile ComFrame should build on the collective 
wisdom and experience of the local frameworks in each jurisdiction. I hope that the IAIS 
would provide for a way that allows jurisdictions to ‘grow into’ ComFrame with 
confidence to get it right through a transitional phase-in period. 
 
The IAIS requires all jurisdictions to set out appropriate target criteria for the 
calculation of regulatory capital requirements12 which underlie the calibration of a 
standardized approach. 
 
The IAIS capital adequacy standard includes general provisions on the use of an 
internal model to determine regulatory capital requirements. Qualified management 
information is important, and many insurers are devoting added resources to 
measurement of economic capital and risk, and the sophistication of their risk 
management process and toolsets. The IAIS requires insurers to document the design, 
construction, and governance of the internal model, and the insurer’s Board and senior 
management to understand the consequences of the internal model’s outputs and 
limitations. 
 
2. Risk Based Management and Internal Model 
 
The Basel framework is intended to set the consistent framework to the global 
banks for maintaining market confidence in regulatory ratios and providing a level 
playing field for internationally. The Basel Committee has initiated the Regulatory 
Consistency Assessment Program (RCAP), which observes that the level of Market 
risk-risk-weighted assets (mRWAs) are various due to the bank’s basic Asset 
Management Policy and supervisory action about the level of capital requirement, and 
modeling choices by banks 13.  
                                                  
11 This is the one of key findings of the survey of 19 insurance groups conducted by the Geneva 
Association. ( The Geneva Association document, Group- wide Risk and Capital Management of 
International Active Insurance Groups- Current Practices and Challenges, April 2013 ) 
12 Solvency Ⅱ pillar1 requires Solvency Capital Requirement ( SCR ) at a level where eligible own 
funds will enable insurers to absorb losses to a confidence level of 99.5% VaR over 1 year period 
( equivalent to a 1 in a 200 year ). 
Although at an international level, unlike banking, there is no agreed capital adequacy standard 
among jurisdictions, the IAIS has recently announced to build a risk-based Insurance Capital 
Standard into ComFrame. 
13 Bank for International Settlements, Regulatory consistency assessment programme ( RCAP ) –
Analysis of risk weighted Assets for market risk January 2013.  
 
The actuarial methods aim at calculating best estimated reserves for insurance 
liability are not standard terminology nor in line with current actuarial practices. Often 
valuation models and risk assessment models are constructed varying the investment 
component to project future cash flows stochastically.  
 
Insurance liability cash flows are in a significant level of complexity in creating 
models. Nevertheless the acceptable modeling is expected to be simplified and enough 
transparent to enable adequate auditing of the work. Since managing risk is the essence 
of insurance business insurers should integrate risk into management process as 
described in COSO Ⅱ-ERM14. 
 
An insurance group should maintain the financial strength even under the severe 
stress situations for securing commitments made to policyholders and customers. 
Furthermore, prudent deployment of capital has the objective of meeting heterogeneous 
expectations of various interested parties (e.g. high shareholders’ return expectations 
versus stringent regulatory capital requirements versus clients’ expectations of 
reasonably priced products). Higher quality risk data equates to more confident and 
better business decision and allocation of finite resources. Internal models are 
considered to be an integral component of business steering processes. They enable a 
consistent view across business units, ensure that the long-term nature of insurance 
business is properly accounted for and support strategic decision-making such as: 
 
*market consistent valuation of all assets and liability ( so called “economic balance 
sheet”) 
*evaluation of integrated risk 
*underpin the set up risk appetite statement 
*build up own risk and solvency assessment framework and so on. 
 
3. Improvement factors of insurance ERM towards the next generation 
 
Insurance ERM has been developed steadily in the past. However the uncertainty 
has been increasing as well at the same time. Therefore we should evolve ERM further 
as the tool of better risk based management. I would like to raise several points with 
which the next generated insurance ERM should be equipped. 
  
A. Improve internal model and complement its bounds 
 
Insurers’ strategy is particular by them own because the nature of portfolio, future 
vision, values, and basic values are different. Therefore management should set their 
strategy, risk tolerance and appetite and make positive risk communication to share the 
                                                  
14 The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) is a joint 
initiative of the five sector organizations, and their mission is to provide thought leadership through 
the development of frameworks and guidance on enterprise risk management, internal control and 
fraud deterrence. The COSO was originally designed to provide a standard for structuring internal 
control systems and expanding to ERM.  
stake holders. In order to execute corporate mission and secure the shareholders’ return 
and sustainable growth, management should adjust the corporate strategy, risk 
tolerance, and risk appetite comprehensively because there are not necessarily in 
coherent direction rather in trade off relationship among the regulators’ solvency 
requirement for the policy holders’ protection, corporate expected level of financial 
soundness, longer term economic value, and shorter term realized profit. Insurers’ 
assets and liabilities react so complicatedly due to economical scenarios. Therefore 
insurers try to make an appropriate internal model to review and analyze them for 
better rational decision making. 
 
None can predict exactly the future. Insurers challenge their opportunities for 
success and growth, and at the same time they should make a great effort to restrain its 
risk within the tolerable level.  
 
Frank H. Knight was the first to propose a clear distinction between risk and 
uncertainty15  . He defines “Risk” as the randomness with knowable probabilities 
( measurable uncertainty ), while “Uncertainty” is the randomness with unknowable 
probabilities ( unmeasurable uncertainty ). 
 
For rational decision against uncertainty, insurers have been developing their 
internal model. It is said that while internal models of different insurers superficially 
might look differently, the underlying structure is quite similar. The structure is easiest 
to explain for a model with a scenario approach. In such a model, scenarios are 
generated which allow the estimation of the value of assets and liabilities as well as the 
required solvency capital16.  
 
Internal model is powerful tool for management but we should clearly notice its 
bounds and the uncertainty embedded in it. The model is simplified under the built-in 
assumptions and we do not always have enough data to underpin modeling in order to 
valuate insurers’ liabilities from the economical basis by replication of the deeply and 
liquidly traded financial instruments.  As a result, insurance liabilities cannot be 
perfectly replicated. An optimal replicating portfolio has the mismatch with the actual 
liability cash flows, and therefore we should recognize the basis risk.  
 
In the case of the fat tail risk like Natural Catastrophe risk ( ex. Earthquake, wind 
storm, typhoon etc. ) the model consist of a hazard module, a vulnerability module, and 
a financial module. The understanding of the hazard’s mechanism and its mathematical 
representation are generally difficult for scientists. The hazard information mainly 
comes from a historic event catalog that covers the range of observed events with 
respect to size, location and probability of occurrence. The potential impact of the 
hazard at each location is translated into damage through so-called vulnerability 
functions which are derived from insurance claims data and engineering analysis. 
Those sets of relationships describe the degree of loss to a structure resulting from 
exposure to a hazard of a given intensity. The models incorporate regional damage 
functions specified by structure and occupancy type.  
 
                                                  
15 Frank H. Knight ,Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (1921) Signalman Publishing 2009 
16 Philipp Keller, Internal Models for the Suiss Solvency Test, Mitteilungen der schweiz. 
Aktuarvereinigung. Heft 1/2007 53-68 
Catastrophe modeling technology is not static and the models themselves continue 
to evolve in terms of detail, realism, and accuracy. However commercial models may not 
cover all the geographical areas and perils of interest or reach a satisfactory level of 
accuracy. In general, probabilistic cat models capture two type of uncertainty, commonly 
named primary ( aleatory ) and secondary ( epistemic ) uncertainty. The former related 
to the likelihood of a certain event to occur. And the latter is defined as uncertainty in 
the amount of loss, given that a particular event has occurred. Uncertainty is associated 
with the modeling of hazard, the level of vulnerability and specification,(e.g. geographic 
resolution, construction characteristics, and local conditions) and the portfolio data. 
That is partially because it is difficult to collect enough scientific data and information 
to make the model’s parameter robust. Actually the return period of earthquake is said 
hundreds and thousands, while written record on the oldest earthquake in Japan is the 
one just about 1,600 years ago. It goes without saying that the data is not enough to 
eliminate uncertainty from the model. 
 
    For complementing the bounds of internal model we should reinforce stress testing 




Insurers need to set aside a capital buffer to secure their resilience and cover losses 
arising from unexpected extreme events that may not necessarily be modeled or even 
foreseen.17 To evaluate a proper level of stress buffer we should reinforce the stress 
testing from the following aspects. 
 
*Providing forward-looking assessments of risk. 
 
*Complementing limitations of models and historical data. 
 
*Supporting internal and external communication on stress events. 
 
*Informing the setting of risk tolerance. 
 
*Facilitating the development of risk mitigation or contingency plan across a range of 
stressed conditions. 
 
The following weakness18 in stress testing practices was pointed out. 
 
*Direct involvement of senior management in deciding the stress testing framework 
and in developing stress scenarios is not deep enough. 
 
*Degree of stress assumed in the stress scenario is often intentionally set within 
tolerable risk limit. 
 
                                                  
17 Further reference to Goto, S., 2013, Building up capital buffers and recognizing judgement risk, 
Asia Insurance Review January 2013, PP.76,77. 
18 Further reference to the following papers. Principles for sound stress testing practices and 
supervision, May 2009, Bank for International Settlements, Stress Testing Thematic Review, UK FSA, 
October 2006, Final Report of the Institute of International Finance ( IIF ) Committee on Market Best 
Practices: Principles of Conduct and Best Practice Recommendations Financial Services Industry 
Response to the Market Turmoil of 2007-2008,July 2008. 
*Stress testing results are not used for management discussions on how to strengthen 
the firm against risks. 
 
*Scenario based on a firm- or group-wide perspective has not been developed. 
 
*”Forward-looking” scenario has not been developed. 
 
*Scenarios are developed only by a small group of experts within the risk management 
department and are not reviewed by a third party, such as internal audit. 
 
A statistical risk measure like Value at Risk ( VaR ) shows the largest loss given a 
certain probability, but it does not tell anything about the reasons of such loss. Stress 
testing, in contrast, is about to depict the background story and shows what happens to 
the portfolio under such stressful circumstance. Estimated loss together with its 
background information would help the management understand the risk profiles of the 
balance sheet and/or business portfolios.  Stress testing would make manager to 
complement the bounds of model risk and to consider the contingency plan19  in 
advance. 
 
Emerging risk monitoring  
 
Insurers review in a form of risk resister the important potential risky events to 
give the heavy impact to their balance sheet which reflect the assumptions for the 
business plan and risk management plan. 
 
However risk is always changing and new risks emerge due to changes of internal 
and external hazard. Like blind men and an elephant we could not easily recognize the 
whole features of risk. It illustrates that the behavior of experts in fields where there is 
inaccessibility of information is likely to be a fallacy. To prevent from such situation we 
need maintain broad communication network and carry on an interactive review with 
respect for different perspectives. The assessment from only the framework of insurer’s 
individual risk portfolio is like the one from the limited part of an elephant, which 
results in walking into a trap of relativism. The rapid globalization, technological 
development, and changes in nature ( particularly in terms of climate change and earth 
movement ) force us be close to such a trap. 
 
The particular events treated unthinkable to happen at the time of plan setting will 
increase the possibility of its occurrence we should recognize it as a scope of our usual 
monitoring. When they become to be probable we should treat it to the one of risk 
categories for day to day management and should change and amend the current 
policies and business plans if any. A forward looking exercise is practical monitoring to 
better anticipate the future, we should carefully monitor the symptom of the important 
hazard changing.  
 
B. Overcome the bounded rationality20 
                                                  
19 A contingency plan is one of the crisis management methods and describes reactions to 
pre-determined crisis before it actually comes true. This approach is useful to avoid mess-up in 
operation and enables systemic responses to the crisis. 
20 Bounded rationality is the idea proposed by Herbert A. Simon that in decision-making, rationality 
 
We should reinforce our own decision mechanism as well. Our decision itself is 
surrounded by unconscious behavioral risk. Our past experience is meaningless for the 
newly born risks. Even the familiar risk our current knowledge is not perfect due to 
changing nature of risk in addition our rationality is bounded and we have a chance to 
cloud our eyes by our own biases 21. In these reasons risk management must address 
the behavior– the biases, attitudes and habits –of the persons making risk-related 
decisions. 
 
We have a tendency to make a decision with heuristics based on past experiences 
and knowledge ( System 1 Think ) and in cases where we feel it failed, then we move on 
to analytical consideration ( System 2 Think ).  In other words we naturally and 
unconsciously make almost all decisions by System 1 Think. [See FIGURE 1.] 
 
Insert FIGURE 1 
 
FIGURE 2 shows an illustration of improper risk in real decision process comparing 
with the normative one. 
 
Insert FIGURE 2 
 
ERM should hold the organizational mechanism to cope with the bounded 
rationality and to eliminate improper risk takings22. [See FIGURE 3.] 
 
Insert FIGURE 3  
 
C. Reinforce the market solution mechanism  
 
We should clearly recognize the bounds of private insurance system against 
uncertainty. That means the risk out of the scope of law of large numbers could not be 
underwritten by the usual private insurance system. However for such risk like the fat 
tail events (high-severity, low-frequency events ), if the insurance coverage is needed 
from political, social, and economical viewpoints, the initiatives for the special solution 
mechanism like pre-funded catastrophe reserve system, mandatory pooling schemes, 
and government reinsurance scheme for highly public lines of business should be taken.     
Such market solution mechanism and private insurance system should be effectively 
                                                                                                                                                  
of individuals is limited by the information they have, the cognitive limitations of their minds, and the 
finite amount of time they have to make a decision. In Models of Man, Simon points out most people 
are only partly rational, and are emotional in the remaining part of their actions. Sharing such idea 
Kahneman and Tversky developed Frame, Heuristics, and Prospect Theory. 
21 Every individual is influenced by his or her own biases to some extent. Max H. Bazerman and Don 
A. Moore, Judgment in Managerial Decision Making, 2012 Wiley, examines judgment in a variety of 
organizational contexts, and provides practical strategies for changing and improving decision-making 
processes. 
22 Further reference to Goto, S. ,2007, The Bounds of Classical Risk Management and the Importance 
of a Behavioral Approach, Risk Management and Insurance Review 2007, Vol.10, No.2, 267-282., Goto, 
S., 2009, Behavioral Risk Management for Improper Risk Taking, Advances in Management, 2009, Vol. 
2(4) April, 7~15. 
collaborated and coordinated. In such sense how the market solution mechanism works 
should be considered clearly as a complementing factor in the term of ERM. 
 
To foster the innovative workable solution mechanism interactive communication 
between regulators and insurers becomes much more important. When regulators 
design the market solution mechanism their analysis and simulation should be matched 
with the objective and the nature of target risk because they are classified the regional 
context and the global one. Also the regional issue and global one would be different due 
to the related laws, regulations, market practice, and connected systems.  
 
The solution of natural catastrophe is a regional issue because its occurrence, the 
social preventing system, and the crisis management system are different from market 
to market. Therefore its treatment should be fit to the local context and initiated by the 
local regulator and insurers. On the other hand the systemic risk like the Financial 
Crisis becomes much more globally connected and need to be treated with global context, 




FIGURES  Improving insurance ERM towards next generation 
 
 




















(Generated by considering Kahneman, D. Nobel Prize Lecture “Maps of Bounded Rationality: 
Perspective on Intuitive Judgment and Choice” Dec. 8 2002 and Finkelstein, S., 
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FIGURE 3:  Additional reviewing and checking mechanism 
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